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tee of trustworthiness of the record itself, 
and upon the inconvenience and well-nigh 
impossibility of producing witnesses who 
could from their own personal knowledge 
testify to the truth of the entries made." 
152 Md. 439, 446, 137 A. 43, 45 (1925). 
Globe emphasized that from the hospital's 
standpoint 
there could be no more important 
record than the chart which indicates 
the diagnosis, the condition, and treat-
ment of the patients. . .. It is difficult 
to conceive why this record should not 
be reliable. There is no motive for the 
person, whose duty it is to make the 
entries, to do other than record them 
correctly and accurately. 
Id. at 446-47, 137 A. at 46. 
This theory is codified as Md. Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-101 (1987 Repl. 
Vol.). This statute declares 
(a) ... "Business" includes business, 
profession, and occupation of every 
kind. 
(b) ... A writing or record made in the 
regular course of business as a memo-
randum or record of an event is admis-
sible to prove the act, transaction, 
occurrence, or event. 
(c) ... The practice of the business 
must be to make such written records 
of its acts at the time they are done or 
within a reasonable, time afterwards. 
(d) ... The lack of personal knowledge 
of the maker of the written notice may 
be shown to affect the weight of the 
evidence but not its admissibility. 
In Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard 'U. 
Scherpenisse, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland included hospital records within 
the scope of this statute, explaining that 
the statute's purpose was to broaden the 
rule of evidence that limited one's testimo-
ny to what was personally known or 
observed. 187 Md. 375, 381,50 A.2d 256, 
260 (1946). Some entries within hospital 
records, however, have been declared inad-
missible. Gregory 'U. State held that this leg-
islation did not extend to a document 
containing a psychiatrist's opinion of an 
individual's mental capacity or criminal 
responsibility. 40 Md. App. 297, 325, 391 
A.2d 437, 454 (1978). 
Based on its review of the aforemention-
ed authorities, the Garlick court concluded 
that the "pathologically germane" entries 
in hospital records are generally admissible 
because they are part of a hospital's 
"regular course of business." 313 Md. at 
223, 545 A.2d at 33. The U.S. Supreme 
Court declared in Palmer 'U. Hoffman that 
"regular course" of business finds "its 
meaning in the inherent nature of the busi-
ness in question and in the methods sys-
tematically employed for the conduct of 
the business as a business." 318 U.S. 109, 
115 (1943). The court of appeals cited with 
approval the dissenting opinion of New 
York Life Ins. 'U. Taylor, which reasoned 
that a hospital's "regular course of busi-
ness" is the treatment of patients. In order 
to fullfill this obligation, a hospital 
methodically maintains a record. Other-
wise, a hospital cannot render adequate 
treatment. 147 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 
1945). 
The court of appeals also relied upon the 
holding in Pratt 'U. State that the informa-
tion within a hospital record is admissible 
"as long as it is pathologically germane." 
39 Md. App. 442, 455, 387 A.2d 779, 787 
(1978), affd, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 
(1979). It then determined that" 'patholog-
ically germane' ... includes facts helpful 
to an understanding of the medical or sur-
gical aspects of the case, within the scope 
of medical inquiry." 313 Md. at 222, 545 
A.2d at 33. 
After establishing this premise, the court 
sought to determine whether Garlick's 
hospital record was prepared in the 
"regular course of business" and if its con-
tents were "pathologically germane" to 
his condition. If so, the document could be 
admitted into evidence under the hearsay 
rule exception. 
Therefore, the significant facts of the 
case were recounted. The emergency room 
doctor examining Garlick ordered the 
blood and urine tests to understand why 
the patient responded poorly in his neuro-
logical exam. The doctor was not present 
when the blood sample was taken, nor was 
he aware of the identity of the hospital 
employee who conducted the tests. In 
addition, he was not aware whether the 
equipment performing the tests had been 
recently inspected, nor was he aware if the 
testing procedure itself conformed with 
routine practice. Nonetheless, the doctor 
testified that he had every confidence in 
the veracity of the test results. 
It was noted that the doctor did not have 
litigation in mind when he ordered the 
blood sample taken. The sample was tested 
by the hospital and not by the police. 
There was no reason to doubt the record 
on its face. Considerations of utility and 
convenience outweighed the probative 
value behind pursuing the testimony of 
every medical staff member who examined 
either Garlick or his blood. The court con-
cluded, "The examining doctor relied on 
these objective scientific findings for Gar-
lick's treatment and never doubted their 
trustworthiness. Neither do we." 313 Md. 
at 225-26, 545 A.2d at 35. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland paid 
particular attention to the facts in distin-
guishing Garlick's situation from that in 
Moon. It recognized that Garlick's test 
results constituted "pathologically ger-
mane" entries in a hospital record pre-
pared within the hospital's "regular course 
of business." This information, in light of 
the circumstances, satisfied the Afoon 
requirement of substantial reliability. The 
Garlick court, 'therefore, understood that 
Moon was unique in its facts, and rein-
forced the trend that existed before the 
Moon decision. Thus, Maryland continues 
to recognize that one's right to confront 
his accuser is not violated by admitting 
into evidence a hospital record containing 
laboratory test results, even though the 
technician administering those tests is not 
called to testify. 
- Gregory R. Smouse 
Scbocbet 'U. State: STATUTE 
PROHIBITING UNNATURAL AND 
PERVERTED SEXUAL PRACTICES 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGID TO 
PRIVACY WHEN APPLIED TO A 
PRIVATE SEXUAL ACT BETWEEN 
CONSENTING, UNMARRIED, 
HETEROSEXUAL ADULTS 
In Schochet 'U. State, 75 Md. App. 314,541 
A.2d 183 (1988), the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland recently held that a 
statute which prohibits unnatural and 
perverted sexual practices, Md. Ann. Code 
art. 27, §554 (1957), does not violate the 
constitutional right to privacy when it is 
applied to private acts of fellatio between 
consenting, unmarried, heterosexual 
adults. 
Eight separate charges were filed against 
Steven Adam Schochet based upon three 
alleged sexual episodes stemming from an 
alleged rape. Schochet was acquitted of all 
six charges involving force and the lack of 
consent of the victim and of a seventh 
charge of sodomy. He was convicted only 
of a violation of Article 27, §554, which 
prohibits among other things, the act of 
fellatio, which is considered an "unnatural 
and perverted sexual practice." Schochet 
appealed the conviction on the issue of the 
constitutionality of §554 as applied to con-
senting, unmarried, heterosexual adults. 
To begin its analysis, the court of special 
appeals examined whether Schochet had 
standing to raise the constitutional issue of 
whether there is some substantive due pro-
cess right of privacy shielding him from 
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state regulation of noncommercial, con-
sensual, private and adult sexual activity. 
The court held that the appellant was not 
disentitled to raise the issue in any regard, 
because there is no suggestion that the act 
of fellatio in question was commercial, 
public or involved a minor. In addition, 
the evidence clearly permitted a finding 
that the act was consensual; thus, the 
appellant was entitled to a ruling on the 
con.qitutionality of the statute as applied 
to a private act between consenting, 
unmarried, heterosexual adults. Schochet, 
75 Md. App. at 319, 541 A.2d at 185. 
Next, the court examined into which 
class of persons the appellant would fall. 
They stated that there are three significant 
classes: 1) a homosexual couple (male or 
female), 2) an unmarried heterosexual cou-
ple, or 3) a married heterosexual couple. 
They then noted that one class has been 
found to have no constitutional right of 
privacy in their sex lives. "It is now clear 
beyond room for disagreement that the 
Supreme Court has announced that there 
is no constitutional right of privacy to 
engage in homosexual acts." ld. at 319-20, 
541 A.2d at 185 (citing Doe v. Com· 
monwealth's Attorney for City of Rich· 
mond, 425 U.S. 901 (1986), and Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986». 
Since the issue before the court of special 
appeals concerned unmarried heterosexu-
als, and because there has been no direct 
statement concerning a right of privacy for 
such a class, the court undertook an analy-
sis of the development of the right to 
privacy to determine if the Supreme Court 
has stated anything that would suggest that 
§554 is unconstitutional as applied to 
unmarried heterosexuals. 
The court found that the scope of the 
right to privacy and the limitations upon 
the right have been enumerated in a few 
key cases. The forerunner of the newly 
recognized right of privacy stressed the 
intimacy of the marital relation as the basis 
of the protection and "identified the insti-
tution of marriage as 'a relationship lying 
within the zone of privacy created by sev-
eral fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees.''' Schachet at 323, 541 A.2d at 187 
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 
479, 485 (1965». The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland found that it is clear 
that, in reference to "the sacred precincts 
of marital bedrooms," the presence of the 
qualifying adjective "marital" by the 
Supreme Court was not inadvertent. The 
court concluded that the critical difference 
between the bedroom protected in 
Griswold and the bedroom not protected 
in Bowers v. Hardwick is that the bedroom 
in Griswold was a marital bedroom, while 
the bedroom in Bowers was not. Schachet 
at 324, 541 A2d at 187-88. 
The reasoning of the court was that the 
right to sexual privacy should be applied 
only to married couples. The court went 
on to state that: 
On the basis of Griswold v. Connecti· 
cut and (the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Harlan in) Poe v. Ullman, the 
possibility arises that the reason the 
plaintiffs in Bowers v. Hardwick were 
barred from the coverage of the right 
to privacy was because their sexual 
intimacy lacked the unique imprima-
tur of the marital union, not because it 
lacked the quality of heterosexuality. 
ld. at 325, 541 A.2d at 188. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland further examined these Supreme 
Court cases and found that the majority 
had tightly narrowed the right of privacy 
"to a few select subjects, which did not 
include sexual relations of any sort by 
anyone outside of marriage ... " ld. at 327, 
541 A2d at 189. 
Our prior decisions recognizing a right 
to privacy guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment included only per-
sonal rights that can be deemed 
fundamental or implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty.... This privacy 
right encompasses and protects the 
personal intimacies of the home, the 
family, marriage, motherhood, pr<r 
creation, and child rearing. 
ld. at 327, 541 A.2d at 189 (quoting Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 
(1973». 
The court went on to examine the pivot-
al case of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972), which appellant Schochet argued as 
holding that whatever right of privacy was 
recognized for married couples in 
Griswold is to be extended broadly to 
unmarried persons as well. The court con-
cluded that "the opinion, on careful read-
ing, simply does not stand for that." 
Schachet, 75 Md. App. 327-28, 541 A.2d at 
189. In the court's opinion, the language of 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, relied on by the appel-
lant, deals not with a broad right to 
privacy, but is limited to matters concern-
ing the decision of whether to have a child: 
"'If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.'" 
Schachet, 75 Md. App. at 328,541 A.2d at 
189-90 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. at 453). 
The court of special appeals went on to 
conclude that Eisenstadt is not primarily a 
due process case, but an equal protection 
case, and that "it strongly suggests that if 
the purpose of the law was to discourage 
sexual relations outside of marriage, a legis-
lative discrimination between married per-
sons would be a rational one ... " Schachet 
at 331-32, 541 A.2d at 191-92. 
Based on the readings of these cases, the 
court found that there was no evidence 
that the right to privacy covers the sexual 
activity of consenting, unmarried, hetero-
sexual adults. "That right covers the inti-
macy of the marital union; and decisions 
dealing with procreation, contraception 
and abortion. There is not the remotest 
allusion to any constitutional protection 
for sexual activity... outside of mar-
riage." ld. at 339, 541 A.2d at 198. The 
court held that in the absence of any such 
indication, Article 27, §554 is constitution-
al as applied to unmarried persons. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland went on to find that their hold-
ing was fully consistent with their own 
prior rulings and the prior rulings of the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland as to the 
constitutionality of §554. 
It is thus clear that the Supreme Court 
has yet to extend the right to privacy 
much beyond the context of intimate 
relationships. It is not, therefore, coex-
tensive with every intrusion actionable 
under the tort of invasion of privacy, 
nor does it protect rights merely 
important and not fundamental. 
ld. at 349, 541 A.2d at 200 (quoting 
j,lontgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 
512-13, 336 A.2d 97, 105 (1975». 
Appellant also attempted to argue that 
due to the "sexual revolution," modes of 
sexual expression that were once thought 
to be "unnatural" are now part of every-
day life with a significant majority of 
Americans, married and unmarried, heter-
osexual and homosexual. The court agreed 
that may be true, but suggested that such 
an argument should be delivered to the leg-
islature rather than the court. "Unless we 
are to usurp the legislative function under 
the guise of constitutional interpretation, 
we refer such basic policy decisions to the 
branch that is more competent to make 
them and, is furthermore constitutionally 
authorized to make them." Schachet at 350, 
541 A.2d at 201. 
The decision handed down by the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland in Schachet 
narrows the right to privacy in sexual acts 
as applied by the Supreme Court. Where 
the Supreme Court has held that there is 
no right to privacy to engage in homo-
----------------------------------19.2/ The Law Forum-39 
sexual acts. the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland has clearly stated that no such 
right exists for the sexual acts of consent-
ing, unmarried, heterosexual adults. 
According to the court, the right to 
privacy for sexual acts applies only to mar-
ried adults. 
- Leo]. Keenan, III 
Niroo v. Niroo: 
ANTICIPATED RENEWAL 
COMMISSIONS ON INSURANCE 
POLICIES SOLD BY A SPOUSE 
DURING TIlE MARRIAGE ARE 
MARITAL PROPERTY 
In Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d 
35 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that anticipated renewal 
commissions on insurance policies sold by 
a spouse during the marriage but accruing 
after the marriage are marital property 
within the meaning of the Property Dispo-
sition in Divorce Annulment Act (the 
Act), Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. §8-201(e) 
(1984). 
The Niroos were married in 1977. In 
1978, Mr. Niroo became an insurance 
salesman for Pennsylvania Life Insurance 
Company (penn Life), where he received 
commissions on individual policies sold. In 
1980, he entered into agency manager 
agreements with Penn Life and the Execu-
tive Fund Life Insurance Company. Under 
these agreements, Mr. Niroo shared in the 
profits and the losses of the company. The 
agreements entitled him to receive income 
derived from net profits generated from 
the renewal of insurance policies. Further-
more, the contracts specified that the hus-
band's right to these renewal commissions 
"shall be vested in him even if he is perma-
nently and totally disabled, or after his 
death in his heirs and assigns." 313 Md. at 
229, 545 A.2d at 36. 
At trial, Mr. Niroo contended that the 
commissions were not marital property as 
defined by the Act. Alternatively, he con-
tended that if the commissions were deem-
ed marital property, then the value of the 
commissions were offset by advances he 
had drawn against future commissions 
which should properly have been con-
strued as marital property. The trial judge 
disagreed on both counts, holding the 
commissions were marital property and 
that the debt he had incurred could not be 
offset against the commissions. The court 
awarded Mrs. Niroo a $200,000 monetary 
award.Id. at 229-30, 545 A.2d at 37. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari in this case prior to the 
case's consideration by the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland in order to "con-
sider the important question involved in 
this case." Id. at 230, 545 A.2d at 37. On 
appeal, Mr. Niroo asserted that the "spe-
culative and contingent nature of these 
commissions" rendered him a tenuous 
property interest which was not within 
the definition of marital property as con-
templated by the legislature in section 8-
201(e). Id. at 232, 545 A.2d at 38. Because 
he had to "work" these accounts through 
activities which would take place after the 
marriage was dissolved, Mr. Niroo argued 
that the commissions were not "acquired" 
during the marriage. He therefore con-
tended that "the classification of renewal 
commissions as marital property would 
improperly give his former wife the fruits 
of his future efforts and would penalize 
him if the renewal commissions were not 
realized." Id. 
The court of appeals did not agree, and 
it affirmed the holding of the trial court 
that the commissions were marital proper-
ty. It reiterated its conclusion that the Act 
significantly changed traditional notions 
of property rights between spouses and 
broadened the concept of marital proper-
ty.Id. at 229, 545 A.2d at 37. Marital prop-
erty may be "'construed to include 
obligations, rights and other intangibles as 
well as physical things.'" Id. at 233, 545 
A.2d at 38 (quoting Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 
Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767, (1942». The 
proper analysis to determine marital prop-
erty was, "first, to decide whether the 
property right was acquired during the 
marriage and second, whether it is equita-
ble to include it as marital property, 
without regard to whether the right is 
vested or not." Niroo at 233, 545 A.2d at 
38-39 (citing Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 
115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981». Despite Mr. 
Niroo's claim that after the dissolution of 
the marriage he must still "service" these 
accounts in order to realize the renewal 
commissions, the court held that "[t]he 
husband's primary effort was expended in 
acquiring the original policies." Niroo at 
235, 545 A.2d at 40. Furthermore, the 
court of appeals referred to the evidence 
presented at trial which showed that the 
commissions were not found to be spe-
culative. Evidence showed that "72% of 
existing policies will be automatically 
renewed after the first year; 82% ... the 
second year; and 88% will be renewed 
thereafter." Id. Thus, the court held that 
the property right to these commissions 
was manifestly vested during the marriage, 
and was, therefore, enforceable as marital 
property. 
Moreover, the court of appeals stated 
that it was settled that an insurance agent 
has a vested right in renewal commissions. 
Id. at 234-35,545 A.2d at 39 (citing Travel-
ers Ins. Co. v. Hermann, 154 Md. 171, 185, 
140 A. 64 (1928». Thus, "contractually 
vested rights in renewal commissions are a 
type of property interest within the defini-
tion of marital property under section 8-
201(e)." Niroo at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. This 
right was established in Mr. Niroo's agen-
cy contract with Penn Life, which provid-
ed that should he "die or become disabled, 
his right to receive the renewal commis-
sions, as well as his heirs' rights thereto, 
would not be affected." Id. at 235, 545 
A.2d at 39. The court reasoned that 
because the husband had a vested right in 
the commissions, they were a valuable 
asset "not separable from the original poli-
cies sold during the marriage, and thus 
properly a part of the couple's shared 
assets during the marriage." Id. at 237,545 
A.2d at 40. 
Although the court of appeals noted that 
the Act expanded the concept of marital 
property, the court did note that some 
rights and interests were not includable as 
marital property. Among these are an 
inchoate personal injury claim arising 
from an accident during the marriage, 
which it considered as so "uniquely per-
sonal that it could not be considered mari-
tal property 'acquired' during the marriage 
..•. " Id. at 234, 545 A.2d at 39. Also 
excluded from the definition of marital 
property was a medical degree or license, 
which the court considered a "mere 
expectancy of future enhanced income ... 
personal to the holder [and] cannot be 
transferred, pledged or inherited." Archer 
v. Archer, 303 Md. 347,357,493 A.2d 1074 
(1985). Despite Mr. Niroo's contention 
that the renewal commissions were so 
uniquely personal as to disqualify them as 
le!re 
alasing in 
ana 
killer. 
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